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Dr Anca Chirita – Written evidence (CMP0013)
General 
Question 1: What should competition policy in the UK set out to achieve? 
1. UK competition policy should make domestic markets work better for the 
benefit of a broadly defined range of consumers, but mostly final consumers, 
i.e., citizens. First, it should accelerate vigorous competition enforcement against 
anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant and, foremost, oligopolistic 
market positions; and it should deal with potentially harmful mergers that have 
an impact on UK markets. Second, it should resist the temptation to govern 
markets through self-inflicted harmful protectionist measures, such as state aid 
or domestic subsidies favouring domestic producers and such like. 
2. The ideal scenario following the UK’s departure would be to maintain the 
current status quo in terms of UK competition policy: (i) driving economic 
growth through affordable prices for high quality and innovative products and/or 
services and (ii) becoming better enforcers of competition laws, namely, the UK 
Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002, as amended by the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013. I believe that an industrial strategy 
that attempts to keep a handful of failing businesses alive or, indeed, active in 
the UK through the issuance of comfort letters, potentially discriminatory 
subsidies, and financial contributions will all have a negative impact on domestic 
competition based on an inefficient allocation of resources and, in the long-run, 
will discourage foreign investment in the UK. 
3. In an undesirable scenario of the UK defaulting on World Trade Organization 
rules, the UK is, nonetheless, bound by the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures so that any potential subsidies granted to a domestic 
enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries, are either prohibited 
or actionable. I would not engage with further details at this stage, given that I 
do not know whether there is going to be a trade deal. Suffice it to say that the 
EU’s official position is that, in the first instance, there will be a withdrawal 
agreement only, not a trade deal.
What guiding principles should shape the UK’s approach to competition 
policy after Brexit? 
4. I assume that that there will definitely be a withdrawal agreement concluded 
some time by the end of March 2019. EU27 has a population of nearly half a 
billion, so applying the English contract principles means that the EU enjoys a 
stronger bargaining power, and the UK cannot play by its own ‘competition’ 
rules. In other words, the UK competition policy cannot reinvent itself from 
scratch to implement the UK’s own industrial strategy. A favourable trade deal 
for the UK is inseparably linked to an obligation by the UK to do nothing that 
could distort competition within the EU’s Internal Market so that dumping prices, 
tax incentives, and any form of national protectionism (meaning any favourable 
treatment of domestic producers and such like) will not be acceptable. I could, of 
course, reiterate that the following essential principles: maintaining the 
convergence and coherence of UK competition policy will be essential to secure 
such a deal. Therefore, UK competition rules cannot depart significantly from 
previous domestic competition acts (1998 and 2002/2013), so this government 
should make sure that the process of copy-paste runs smoothly and that 
absolutely nothing is unnecessarily cut from the text of our existing domestic 
competition laws; e.g., maintaining formalistic but legally renewable block 
exemption regulations could enhance legal certainty for businesses until the CMA 
engages with various stakeholders and decide their future. 
5. Should it become very clear that there will be no trade deal after 2021, 
including a two-year transition period, something, which I personally doubt, 
there will still be plenty of time to make any necessary alterations. In such an 
optimistic scenario, the CMA will have to maintain its current competition 
enforcement in line with that of the EU Commission in the spirit of mutual 
cooperation. Maintaining the status quo will also benefit businesses that do not 
have to comply with different rules, so any statement to this effect by the CMA 
will only reinforce legal certainty and nurture the UK’s predictable competition 
regime following its withdrawal from the EU.
Antitrust 
Question 2: Post-Brexit, to what extent should the UK seek to maintain 
consistency with the EU on the interpretation of antitrust law? 
6. For the UK’s competition enforcement, the principle of consistency remains 
essential to maintaining current standards of convergence with EU competition 
law. If the intention is to simply incorporate the same body of competition rules 
into existing British statutes but interpret them differently, this could create 
uncertainty for businesses. Businesses already have certain expectations under 
EU competition law that a particular kind of conduct will be dealt with in a 
particular way, but will find that the UK’s approach could be radically different. 
In my opinion, UK courts will still have to observe the future interpretation given 
to EU competition rules and the previous case-law. A pragmatic approach will be 
that CMA and UK courts will not depart from the previous jurisprudence without 
reasonable and good cause, that is to say, for the sake of originality, but for the 
case where there will be a manifest error of assessment. Depending on the kind 
of status the UK might achieve by 2021 and the time UK enforcers will take to 
move away from the previous case-law, it would be pragmatic to recognise 
under S 60 of the UK Competition Act 1998 that ‘EU case-law previously relied 
upon by the CMA in its decisional practice and by the UK courts will remain 
binding precedents until further notice’. This approach can only benefit the 
addressees of competition rules, i.e., businesses that need to function in a 
climate of predictability with foreseeable guidance.
7. As an academic, I should also stress that the UK body of competition 
decisions and case-law is insufficiently developed. Most commentators have 
focused with constructive criticism on what the EU Commission has done well 
and not so well. There is very little to learn from the UK, so turning our back on 
EU competition law might not be wise at all. Learning from it cannot harm either. 
There is an increasing international trend towards greater convergence of 
competition rules, so adopting sensible pathways to ensure trans-Atlantic and 
European consistency of enforcement outcomes could only benefit the UK’s 
competition regime post-exiting the EU.
What opportunities might greater freedom in antitrust enforcement 
afford the UK? 
8. Freedom is beneficial only if it is properly understood. If an EU case-law is 
flawed, it can, and should, be overruled. The EU is not formally bound by 
common law precedent, but displays the same technical formalism so that 
previously held positions are rarely departed from in the jurisprudence. Greater 
freedom when applying the same body of competition rules should not end up 
with businesses being given a more lenient treatment and consumers having to 
pay higher prices for lower quality products or services. I would argue that the 
real deal on freedom will be one where we are not talking about enforcement 
alone, which is the application and interpretation of competition rules, but 
freedom to determine the rules that are to be applied. 
9. Let me respond by asking what the CMA did with its own freedom under EU 
Regulation 1/2003, namely, Article 3 (2), final sentence: ‘Member States shall 
not under this Regulation be precluded from adopting and applying on their 
territory stricter national laws which prohibit or sanction unilateral conduct 
engaged in by undertakings’. It is well-known that some Member States have 
had more detailed provisions. The UK has notably had the criminal cartel 
offence, but just seven cases have been brought since 2008.
Question 3: Will Brexit impact the UK’s status as a jurisdiction of choice 
for antitrust private damages actions? 
10. Private enforcement of competition law needs to be strengthened if the 
public enforcement by the CMA remains unsatisfactory or the CMA is simply 
unable to intervene due to its limited public resources; it is costly, as it shifts the 
cost of litigation from public enforcement funded by taxpayers to individuals with 
a legitimate concern. One cannot know in advance the answer to this question. 
It is tempting to guess that the UK will no longer be the preferred jurisdiction. 
But the same could happen to the default contract law rule of dealing with 
contractual disputes not in England and Wales, but elsewhere in the EU. 
Question 4: Post-Brexit, what is the likelihood of UK authorities 
conducting parallel investigations with the European Commission or 
national competition authorities of EU Member States? What would the 
implications of this be? 
11. Post-Brexit, there will be separate jurisdictions – this depends on the 
withdrawal agreement – and therefore, parallel investigations will inevitably 
occur, but there is nothing wrong with conducting parallel investigations 
provided that at least one competition authority – the CMA or the EU 
Commission – can defend a proper fining decision before the courts if there is 
judicial review. Having two watchdogs instead of one can only benefit consumers 
if at least one of the competition authorities does a good job: detecting and 
punishing anti-competitive conduct. Article 3 (1) of Regulation 1/2003 is 
modelled with this thinking in mind, as it expects the CMA and the UK courts to 
apply both domestic and supra-national competition law where there is an 
impact on cross-border trade. The UK becoming a third-country for the EU 
means that both competition authorities will have jurisdiction to investigate a 
competition case, e.g., a secret cartel.  As Regulation 1/2003 will no longer 
apply, any form of cooperation concerning the sharing of confidential information 
during such investigations should form part of the withdrawal agreement on 
competition. The current position is that the EU Commission can intervene in 
foreign markets in the area of mergers. The current threshold of intervention by 
the CMA, should it be amended following the Repeal Bill, could mean that the UK 
could follow the same approach to intervene in the EU market if there is an 
impact on trade within the UK and vice-versa. As Regulation 139/2004, as 
amended by Implementing Regulation 1269/2013, will also cease to apply, then 
in the absence of a withdrawal agreement on merger notifications, the UK could 
increase its upper threshold for mergers. At present, the CMA has sought to 
reduce the burden of notifications for mergers of insignificant economic 
importance.
12. A possible solution is to remedy this in the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
Act 2013 giving the CMA sole discretion to decide, based on the particular facts 
of a given case, whether to intervene. Another option is to agree with the EU 
Commission on the conduct of such investigations and any forms of future 
cooperation.
13. A direct implication for the CMA is having a higher caseload and, judging by 
the higher number of pending investigations at present, an increasing overload. 
An immediate implication is that the EU Commission will no longer fund public 
enforcement of competition rules that could benefit the UK. Finally, this is a 
massive opportunity for the CMA to hire talented competition lawyers and for UK 
taxpayers to contribute towards better competition enforcement in the UK, as 
prioritisation of competition cases will be done in London, not Brussels.
14. Implications will not be so dramatic for the CMA if public funds are made 
available for the hiring of such expertise. Businesses, however, might need to 
sort out more paperwork in their own time and at their own expense. However, 
the latter is not something for consumers to worry about.
Question 5: Is a post-Brexit competition cooperation agreement in the 
mutual interest of the EU and the UK? What provisions would be 
necessary for such an arrangement to be effective? 
15. A cooperation agreement for the purpose of detecting anti-competitive 
conduct, sharing confidential information, facilitating access to cross-border 
evidence, mutually recognizing enforcement remedies and court rulings, 
reducing the administrative burden of dual notification of a proposed merger, or 
even not having to apply for leniency twice – once in London and again in 
Brussels - will all be essential for the new UK competition regime and its 
international standing and reputation. Given the CMA’s previous longstanding 
close ties with the EU Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition, it 
would be difficult to envisage going forward without a future cooperation 
agreement following the UK’s withdrawal. In a withdrawal agreement, however, 
there should be simple clarifications regarding the cut-off date from which dual 
antitrust investigations or merger notifications will apply and, in the case of 
pending investigations, whether these will not eventually be deferred to the UK 
or simply carried out as usual business. A simple provision could be inserted 
saying that pending cases will follow their current course, but future case will be 
referred to the CMA.
Question 6: How will Brexit affect the CMA’s ability to cooperate with 
non-EU competition authorities? What impact might there be, if any, on 
the UK’s influence in developing global competition policy? 
16. I cannot see the CMA’s ability to cooperate outside of the EU, in the 
International Competition Network or the OECD, to be jeopardised in any way 
post-Brexit, but there might be an impact on the UK’s influence in developing a 
truly ‘global’ competition policy. The CMA will have lost an insider seat in the 
European Competition Network of 27 European states. In my view, the CMA’s 
rather modest track record of domestic cases has to be developed further to 
stand on a par with that of the EU Commission or of the US Federal Trade 
Commission. Unfortunately, I cannot see how the CMA could be strengthened 
internationally without massive investment in its own staffing post-exiting.
Question 7: Will it be necessary for the UK and EU to agree a transitional 
arrangement for antitrust enforcement after the UK’s withdrawal from 
the EU? If so, what transitional issues would such arrangements need to 
address? 
17. A transitional arrangement should reach an agreement about how to 
continue any pending investigations and court proceedings given that 
competition cases take notoriously long to come to be dealt with. There is an 
important issue of legitimate expectations for businesses caught up in the 
middle, and possibly, it will be best for the parties concerned to have a choice of 
applicable laws, i.e., referrals back to the CMA, CAT, or HC. It could also decide 
the fate of existing British nationals working for DG COMP or EU courts should 
they wish to relocate to London given the CMA’s imminent increased workload 
with its ‘sole’ competition jurisdiction. 
Mergers
Question 8: What opportunities does Brexit present for the UK to review 
national interest criteria for mergers and acquisitions? What might the 
advantages and disadvantages of this be? 
18. Article 21 (4), second sentence, of the EU Regulation 139/2004 contains a 
provision favouring public interest mergers which makes it possible to block 
unwanted mergers to defend ‘public security, the plurality of media and 
prudential rules’. An equivalent domestic provision is s 58 of the UK Enterprise 
Act 2002, which is more detailed and so includes national security, media 
quality, plurality and standards, and financial stability, and therefore, has often 
been used quite successfully to preserve the integrity and choice of available 
media enterprises. The latter falls broadly under the heading of ‘public security’. 
A UK concrete addition is maintaining the stability of the UK financial system; 
thus, this is arguably included under the European wider provision of ‘prudential 
rules’. I believe that this public policy clause is very useful; it is a credit to the 
CMA to have used it successfully in the past, and it could only continue to do so 
in future to avoid misleading the wider public through deceptive, fake news by 
private oligopolistic or monopolistic media trusts in the UK which could engage in 
one-party political propaganda. This is just one example that shows how both 
domestic and supra-national/EU competition regimes have complemented each 
other.
Question 9: Does the Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) have the 
capacity to manage an anticipated increase in UK merger notifications 
post-Brexit? Could regulators with concurrent competition powers, e.g. 
Ofgem and Ofcom, play a greater role? 
19. This is something that only the CMA could say; however, an increased 
workload could, potentially, place strains on the CMA’s available human 
resources, and for the CMA to continue operating within the same parameters of 
very tight deadlines, it might be sensible to either (i) relocate existing British 
civil servants working for DG COMP to London, should they so wish, or (ii) start 
recruiting more case handlers in preparation for the take-over period so they are 
already in place before the transitional period starts. Sectoral regulators are 
useful, too, but not all mergers will touch upon gas, electricity, and 
communications markets only. It might also be that should there be economic 
downturn, the level of foreign investments will reduce the appetite for internal 
growth through mergers and acquisitions activity. In the case of an economic 
crisis, however, failing firms could be even more interested in merging activities 
with larger viable businesses. However, one cannot make accurate predictions at 
this stage; beyond macroeconomic indicators of economic performance, all 
depends on the markets affected and how the CMA will prioritise its future cases.
Question 10: How burdensome would dual CMA/European Commission 
merger notifications be for companies? 
10. I would say that one has to be careful about what ‘dual’ notification could 
mean in practice since we do not know yet whether the UK will secure a trade 
deal within the internal market or else be treated as a foreign market for the EU. 
In the first scenario, referrals might well remain in place, so duplication of effort 
is best avoided. The current system allows the EU Commission itself to refer 
back to the CMA any merger that threatens to affect significantly competition 
within the UK market.  The new system could mean that such mergers could be 
ruled out at the end of Phase I investigations as being beyond the scope of the 
EU Merger Regulation 139/2004. The parties concerned will have to notify the 
CMA of the merger before its implementation. However, based on current 
statistics, there are overall 332 accepted referrals for EU28 out of a total of 
6,684 notifications. This represents fewer than 5% of all notified mergers over a 
period of 28 years of EU merger control. It could be that the UK will have to take 
over in time an additional burden of 11 to 20 cases. No one can predict the exact 
number of fillings required, but a possible solution could be the administrative 
cutting of lengthier forms. Such forms have recently been simplified; however, 
these remain notoriously tedious and long for businesses, but a lucrative bonus 
for lawyers.
Question 11: How likely is it that parallel merger reviews by the 
European Commission and CMA would lead to divergent outcomes? 
What would be the likely implications of such a scenario? 
11. I would say that divergent outcomes are a myth inspired by a few divergent 
merger decisions reached by the EU Commission and US FTC in the past. The 
substantive tests under EU and UK merger control are, however, convergent and 
economics-based. A divergent outcome means that a proposed merger will be 
blocked for competition concerns, instead of going ahead. There are only 27 
cases of blocked EU mergers, which is 0.4% of all notifications, so the possibility 
that this fractional figure could affect implementing a merger in the UK remains 
very low, in my view. The reason for arriving at different decisions is that 
different markets require different strategies so that a merger could eventually 
benefit competition in one market, but affect competition in another.
Question 12: Do either the CMA or the European Commission currently 
cooperate with other non-EU national competition authorities on 
concurrent merger reviews? 
12. Outside the remit of the European Competition Network, the International 
Competition Network could provide a forum for reaching a multilateral 
agreement on mutual cooperation depending on the ramification of merger 
notifications and the impact on a number of foreign markets and jurisdictions. 
Post-Brexit, the UK will have to reach similar bilateral agreements on mutual 
cooperation with other competition authorities worldwide with which the CMA 
presently cooperates and/or has close economic ties.
Question 13: Will it be necessary for the UK and EU to agree a 
transitional arrangement for merger control after the UK’s departure 
from the EU? If so, what transitional issues would such an arrangement 
need to address? 
13. Transitional arrangements should provide certainty for businesses that have 
notifications pending review by the EU Commission or Courts on continued 
jurisdiction or any potential referrals and the expected cut-off date of phased 
transition, recognition of remedies, and monitoring of commitments, as well as 
mutual judicial recognition of decisions and judgements. 
State Aid
Question 14: Are state aid provisions likely to form an essential 
component of any future trade agreement between the UK and EU? Do 
any existing trade agreements between the EU and third countries 
provide a useful precedent for future UK-EU state aid arrangements? 
14. Taking as an example the 1985 trade agreement between the EU and China, 
there is no agreement on state aid rules, as far as we know, but there is mutual 
recognition for a most-favoured-nation treatment regarding custom duties, 
clearance, transit, taxes, and other levies. Meanwhile, China has demonstrated 
its commitment to adopt similar competition rules, including antitrust and 
mergers. Taking the example of the UK’s close geographical proximity and 
benefits obtained from EU state aid policy, it would be in the economic, social, 
and cultural interest of the UK to negotiate aid for natural disasters or 
exceptional circumstances; regional aid to alleviate poverty, such as a lack of 
local jobs; or aid necessary to preserve UNESCO sites and heritage. In the 
absence of any agreement of this kind, the UK government will have to come up 
with its own funding figure.
Question 15: Will the UK require a domestic state aid authority after 
Brexit? 
15. No, governmental action to supply funding would suffice. The same goes for 
Too-Big-to-Fail banks in the event of an economic crisis; then, the UK 
government should inject monies into banking or best allow such inefficient 
banks to exit the market. 
Question 16: What would be the opportunities and challenges for state 
aid or subsidy controls in the UK if no trade agreement were to be 
reached with the EU? Would WTO anti-subsidy rules restrict the UK’s 
ability to support industries, or individual companies, through 
favourable tax arrangements? 
16. I have now run out of space. Briefly, if the UK were to offer certain groups of 
individuals or industries more favourable tax arrangements, this could trigger a 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism, provided that the purpose of such an 
arrangement is in the form of a financial contribution by the UK government or 
another public body. A fiscal incentive, even without any governmental expense 
paid by the UK, could nevertheless distort competition and still be considered to 
be a WTO subsidy. Given that the subsidy in question would be paid to a certain 
group of individuals or industries only, that subsidy would be considered as a 
‘specific’ one under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures. As someone who, a long time ago, acquired a master’s specialising in 
WTO law, I would caution against defaulting on WTO rules with the sole purpose 
of acting in a protectionist fashion, not least because all WTO agreements are 
historically the true foundation of competition rules on a truly global scale on the 
basis of open market access, elimination of barriers, and the principle of non-
discrimination. Yet, there is no multilateral agreement that details such 
competition rules; thus, the whole is the sum of its parts. The EU Commission, 
however, has moved from a historic understanding of state aid to an 
international dimension that covers intervention by the state through grants, 
interest and tax relief, guarantees, and so on. This makes it highly likely that the 
EU will action the UK before Appellate Bodies in the event that competition is 
distorted, as UK goods or services will inevitably affect EU markets. There will be 
no escape through WTO subsidies rules given that even the state aid granted by 
the Irish government to Apple found no special protection inside the EU itself.
Question 17: How will the Government’s industrial strategy shape its 
approach to state aid after Brexit? To what extent has the European 
Commission’s state aid policy limited interventions that the UK 
Government may have otherwise pursued? 
17. Industrial strategy is more popular with failing businesses than with those 
competing on their own merits. Any governmental intervention will allocate 
available resources on the basis of pre-determined criteria that could favour only 
a few market players. The effect on the market could be assessed only 
retrospectively, not prospectively. Let’s assume that the UK had continued to 
subsidise its mining sector despite moving away from coal heating. An inefficient 
allocation of resources would have continued to distort competition in the market 
for alternative sources of energy and to damage our environment. An industrial 
strategy favouring this particular industry and its enterprises would, indeed, 
have avoided massive unemployment, but would have failed to address the lack 
of competitiveness of the industry in question. Thus, it is sensible to create new 
jobs and train the workforce in advance of dealing with business failures and 
employing populist industrial strategies. The government cannot bail out all the 
affected industries of the whole economy post-existing. Therefore, some 
industries will claim they are being discriminated against and will lack the 
incentives to boost their own productivity, knowing that others are receiving 
preferential financial benefits. While I am not a fan of the EU’s state aid policy 
either, in particular of TBTF banks, I am sympathetic to noble causes, such as 
state aid for natural disasters, regional aid to combat poverty due to 
governmental inaction in creating new jobs and training people, and 
environmental and heritage conservation. So, it all depends on what kind of 
state aid the government wants to pursue post-Brexit.
Question 18: What, if any role, might the devolved institutions play in 
UK state aid control post-Brexit? Are there any potential implications for 
the UK internal market?
18. It is up to them to decide. 
Question 19: Will it be necessary for the UK and EU to agree a 
transitional arrangement for state aid matters after the UK’s withdrawal 
from the EU? If so, what transitional issues would such an arrangement 
need to address? 
19. A transitional arrangement on state aid should agree a cut-off date post-
exiting for previous state aid granted to the UK and clarify whether the UK will 
continue to benefit from it following its departure until the end of the financial 
term agreed by the UK. It would be costly for the government to pay for 
something that it had financially committed to, but had to leave before having 
had the opportunity to spend such aid. Anyone in receipt of such aid that is not 
fully spent by the cut-off date could claim that a legitimate expectation indeed 
exists for the UK government to cover it.
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